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ABSTRACT 
 
EXPLORING THE ACCURACY OF HIGHLY POSITIVE SELF-EVALUATIONS:  
 
A BOGUS PIPELINE EXAMINATION OF FRAGILE SELF-ESTEEM 
 
by Erin Michele Myers 
 
August 2010 
 
 The present study tested the prediction that individuals with fragile high self-
esteem are engaging in impression management when they claim to possess highly 
positive feelings of self-worth. Phase One participants (N = 449) completed internet-
based measures of self-esteem level and self-esteem fragility under standard conditions. 
Phase Two participants (N = 75) completed laboratory-based measures of self-esteem 
under control or ‘bogus pipeline’ conditions designed to encourage participants to 
respond more honestly to questionnaires concerning their self-worth. Hierarchical 
multiple regression analyses revealed partial support for the impression management 
hypothesis such that individuals with discrepant high self-esteem (i.e., high explicit self-
esteem and low implicit self-esteem as measured by the Name-Letter Task) reported 
lower levels of explicit self-esteem under bogus pipeline conditions. The impression 
management hypothesis was not supported for an alternate measure of implicit self-
esteem (i.e., Implicit Association Test) or for the two other markers of self-esteem 
fragility included in the study (i.e., contingent self-esteem and self-esteem instability). 
The discussion will focus on the implications of the present findings for the current 
conceptualization of fragile high self-esteem.  
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1  
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Acting is all about honesty. If you can fake that, you've got it made.  
-George Burns, American comedian, actor, and writer (1896 - 1996) 
 
In order to put on a believable performance, an actor must convey sincerity. As 
suggested by the opening quote from George Burns, an actor who has the ability to fake 
honesty may, indeed, have it made. In a similar fashion, some individuals may attempt to 
fake honesty in their daily lives by acting out the role of having high self-esteem, even 
when they do not seem to actually feel especially good about themselves. However, 
unlike actors who are performing for an audience, it is not clear whether these individuals 
are trying to convince themselves, other people, or both. Despite the wealth of research 
concerning self-esteem, relatively little is known about whether the high levels of self-
esteem some individuals claim to possess tell the entire story regarding their actual 
feelings of self-worth. Past research suggests that some individuals may present a façade 
of positive self-regard that may not accurately reflect their genuine feelings of self-worth 
(Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989; Bosson, Brown, Zeigler-Hill, & Swann, 2003; 
Brown, 1991; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003; Olson, Fazio, 
& Hermann, 2007). That is, the high levels of self-esteem these individuals claim to 
possess on self-report measures may not be an accurate representation of their authentic 
self-evaluations. Whereas some individuals may be trying to convince themselves that 
they honestly believe their positive self-evaluations, others may be attempting to 
convince other people that they possess a positive sense of self-regard.  
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In order to gain a better understanding of how individuals really feel about 
themselves, the present study utilized the bogus pipeline technique in order to encourage 
participants to answer questions about their feelings of self-worth more honestly. The 
bogus pipeline technique encourages honest responding by leading participants to believe 
that the experimenter has access to their true attitudes through the use of a lie detector 
(Jones & Sigall, 1971; Sigall & Page, 1971). This technique has been used successfully in 
past research to encourage greater honesty (e.g., Alexander & Fisher, 2003; Boysen, 
Vogel, & Madon, 2006; for a review see Roese & Jamieson, 1993) and was used in the 
present study to improve our understanding of why individuals may sometimes report 
higher levels of self-esteem than they actually seem to possess.   
What is Self-Esteem? 
Self-esteem has emerged as one of the most popular and enduring topics in 
psychology. First described by William James (1890), self-esteem was at that time 
characterized as the sense of positive self-regard that develops as a result of consistently 
exceeding one’s important goals. More than a century later, the definition of self-esteem 
initially offered by James remains remarkably relevant such that self-esteem is still often 
thought of as a positive attitude an individual holds toward the self that reflects the extent 
to which an individual feels competent and successful (Coopersmith, 1967). More 
generally, self-esteem refers to an individual’s overall feelings of self-worth and, as a 
result, is often referred to as global self-esteem (Brown & Marshall, 2006; Rosenberg, 
1965).  
In contrast to global self-esteem, which is thought to be relatively stable over time 
(Brown & Marshall, 2006), state self-esteem describes an individual’s self-evaluation at a 
particular moment in time, thus accounting for temporary changes in self-esteem due to 
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emotional reactions to positive or negative events (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). However, 
despite the distinction made between global and state self-esteem, it is important to note 
that state self-esteem over time may largely determine an individual’s global self-esteem. 
For example, much like weather patterns over an extended period of time determine the 
climate, an individual’s daily self-evaluations over an extended period of time may 
strongly influence an individual’s global level of self-esteem (Leary & MacDonald, 
2003).  
Self-esteem has received considerable empirical attention. A great deal of this 
research has focused on the benefits associated with the possession of high levels of self-
esteem. For example, research has shown that high self-esteem is related to positive 
outcomes such as educational performance (Hansford & Hattie, 1982), vocational 
satisfaction (Frone, 2000; Judge & Bono, 2001), happiness (Furnham & Cheng, 2000), 
psychological health (Taylor & Brown, 1988), popularity (Battistich, Solomon, & 
Delucchi, 1993), quality of social interactions (Keefe & Berndt, 1996), and overall life 
satisfaction (Diener & Diener, 1995). One explanation for the relationship between high 
self-esteem and positive outcomes comes from self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 
1995). This explanation suggests that individuals who develop an autonomous sense of 
self may be more likely to experience positive feelings about themselves. These positive 
feelings may then lead to successful outcomes across a variety of domains which may, in 
turn, sustain and bolster an individual’s positive self-evaluations. Another possible 
explanation for the relationship between high self-esteem and positive outcomes is that 
these outcomes may be indicative of an individual’s level of social inclusion (Baumeister 
& Leary, 1995). That is, the social support that is readily available when individuals 
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cultivate meaningful attachments may make the experience of positive life outcomes 
more likely.  
As a complement to research showing that high self-esteem is often related to 
positive outcomes, a great deal of research has also focused on the consequences 
associated with the possession of low levels of self-esteem. For example, low self-esteem 
has been found to be associated with negative outcomes such as depression (Tennen & 
Affleck, 1993), aggression (Gondolf, 1985; Staub, 1989), delinquency (Donnellan, 
Trzesniewski, Robins, Moffitt, & Caspi, 2005), relationship problems (Hendrick, 
Hendrick, & Adler, 1988; Murray, Rose, Bellavia, Holmes, & Kusche, 2002), and 
stressful life events (Lakey, Tardiff, & Drew, 1994). Additionally, low self-esteem during 
adolescence has been found to be associated with poor health, criminal behavior, and 
limited economic prospects during adulthood (Trzesniewski et al., 2006). According to 
self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1995), one possible explanation for the 
relationship between low self-esteem and negative outcomes is a lack of autonomy. That 
is, individuals who do not feel a sense of control over their lives or actions may be more 
likely to experience negative feelings about the self. These negative feelings may then 
make negative outcomes more likely, which may, in turn, reinforce an individual’s 
negative self-conception. Another possible explanation for the relationship between low 
self-esteem and negative outcomes is that these outcomes may simply reflect an 
individual’s level of social exclusion (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). In other words, 
individuals who lack a network of social support may be more likely to experience 
various negative consequences relating to health, adjustment, and well-being. 
Several decades ago, laypersons and researchers alike began to take note of the 
abundance of research findings that often linked high levels of self-esteem to positive 
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outcomes and low levels of self-esteem to negative outcomes. Despite the correlational 
nature of these findings, the popular self-esteem movement began with the idea that 
increasing the self-esteem of individuals would surely lead to more positive outcomes 
across a wide array of domains (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). In 
essence, self-esteem was considered to be something akin to a panacea that could cure 
any number of societal problems ranging from poverty to aggression. For example, the 
state of California created a program aimed at increasing the self-esteem of individuals in 
order to tackle such problems as crime, teen pregnancy, drug abuse, and academic 
underachievement (Mecca, Smelser, & Vasconcellos, 1989). However, as noted in an 
extensive review of the self-esteem literature (Baumeister et al., 2003), it is unclear 
whether self-esteem actually causes any of the outcomes often associated with it or not 
(for counterarguments see Swann, Chang-Schneider, & Larsen-McClarty, 2007 or 
Trzesniewski et al., 2006). Furthermore, Baumeister and colleagues (2003) argue that 
many attempts to increase self-esteem may actually do more harm than good. For 
example, attempting to increase self-esteem by giving praise where it is not warranted 
may foster feelings of superiority. These feelings may, in turn, help to sustain a sense of 
self-worth that – despite being highly positive – remains vulnerable to challenge.   
Despite the many positive outcomes often associated with it, high self-esteem has 
also been shown to be related to some negative outcomes. For example, research has 
shown high self-esteem to be associated with such negative outcomes as prejudice 
(Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987; Verkuyten, 1996; Verkuyten & 
Masson, 1995) and aggression (Baumeister, Bushman, & Campbell, 2000; Baumeister et 
al., 2003; Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996; Kernis, Grannemann, & Barclay, 1989; 
Papps & O’Carroll, 1998). One potential reason for the relationship between high self-
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esteem and these negative outcomes is that a subset of individuals with high self-esteem 
exhibit a tendency to engage in a variety of strategies aimed at protecting and enhancing 
their self-views (i.e., threatened egotism; Baumeister et al., 2000; Baumeister, 
Heatherton, & Tice, 1993; Baumeister et al., 1996; Baumeister et al., 1989; Blaine & 
Crocker, 1993; Fitch, 1970; Kernis et al., 1989; Miller & Ross, 1975; Tice, 1991). In 
other words, some individuals may lash out in anger when their positive – yet easily 
threatened – feelings of self-worth are challenged in various ways (Baumeister et al., 
1996).   
How is Self-Esteem Measured 
Owing to the self-evaluative nature of self-esteem (i.e., “How do I feel about 
myself?”), it makes sense that researchers often rely on straightforward self-report 
measures in order to measure self-esteem (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991). In other words, 
individuals are often simply asked to provide ratings of agreement with items designed to 
reflect their explicit feelings of self-worth. This direct approach to the measurement of 
self-esteem has a number of advantages (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991; Bosson, 2006a; 
Zeigler-Hill & Jordan, in press). Foremost, if self-esteem is an attitude about how one 
feels about the self, then individuals may have unique access to that self-knowledge. In 
support of this contention, research has shown that observer-ratings of self-esteem do not 
show strong correlations with self-ratings of self-esteem, even when the observer and 
target are well-acquainted (Buhrmester, Furman, Wittenberg, & Reis, 1988; Watson, 
Suls, & Haig, 2002). Self-report measures are also economical, simple to administer and 
interpret, and have been shown to possess excellent psychometric properties (Bosson, 
2006a). 
7  
In order for direct reports of self-esteem to be accurate, however, there are two 
primary assumptions that must be met. First, people must be aware of their self-esteem. 
Second, people must be willing to answer honestly on self-report measures of self-
esteem. The first key assumption – that individuals have the ability to access their 
genuine feelings of self-worth – may not always be met. That is, individuals may not 
always have complete access to all facets of their self-esteem (Farnham, Greenwald, & 
Banaji, 1999; Hetts & Pelham, 2001). The fact that direct measures of self-esteem have 
been shown to correlate with self-deception would also appear to call this assumption 
into question (Paulhus, 1984, 2002). Self-deception refers to the tendency for individuals 
to report – and honestly believe – a positive conception of self that may not accurately 
reflect their latent feelings of self-worth (Paulhus, 1984, 2002). In other words, 
individuals may present a façade of positive self-regard that – unbeknownst to them – is 
not an accurate reflection of their inaccessible self-views. The possibility that individuals 
may not always be aware of all aspects of their self-attitudes is supported, in part, by a 
body of research showing that individuals, in general, are not always aware of the 
automatic processes underlying much of their behavior (for a review see Bargh, 2006).   
The second key assumption that is necessary in order for direct measures of self-
esteem to be accurate – that individuals will honestly report their feelings of self-worth – 
may also be flawed. That is, high self-esteem may sometimes reflect an individual’s 
desire to give socially desirable responses (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). Due in part to the 
cultural desirability of possessing high self-esteem (Baumeister et al., 2003), some 
individuals may give less than honest responses in order to present themselves to others 
in a positive fashion. In support of this idea, direct measures of self-esteem have been 
shown to correlate with the tendency to manipulate one’s image to create a positive 
8  
impression (i.e., impression management; Paulhus, 1984, 2002; Raskin, Novacek, & 
Hogan, 1991). One recent study that also supports this idea has shown that self-
presentational strategies may influence self-reported explicit self-esteem (Olson et al., 
2007). 
 In addition to conforming to a valued cultural ideal, individuals who present the 
appearance of possessing high levels of self-esteem may stand to reap social benefits. For 
example, individuals who are perceived as having higher levels of self-esteem are often 
viewed more positively by others (Zeigler-Hill & Myers, 2009). Not surprisingly, 
research has shown that individuals who report high levels of self-esteem tend to be 
concerned with cultivating a positive image (Baumeister et al., 1989), making direct 
measures of self-esteem particularly problematic. That is to say, direct measures of self-
esteem appear to be inadequate for determining whether individuals – especially those 
who report high levels of self-esteem – are reporting their genuine feelings of self-worth. 
In order to deal with some of the problems posed by direct measures of self-
esteem (e.g., self-deception and impression management concerns), some researchers 
have developed indirect measures of self-esteem. These nonreactive measures attempt to 
measure self-esteem in a way that bypasses individuals’ conscious – and potentially 
biased – self-evaluations. In contrast to direct measures of self-esteem that are designed 
to capture an individual’s explicit feelings of self-worth, nonreactive measures of self-
esteem are designed to capture what are thought to be an individual’s implicit feelings of 
self-worth (Bosson, 2006b; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Pelham & Hetts, 1999). Whereas 
explicit self-esteem is defined as an individual’s conscious feelings of self-worth that are 
deliberate and flexible (Brown & Marshall, 2006), implicit self-esteem refers to an 
individual’s nonconscious, inflexible, intuitive – and possibly automatic – feelings of 
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self-worth that exist outside of conscious awareness (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Jordan, 
Whitfield, & Zeigler-Hill, 2007; Pelham & Hetts, 1999; Zeigler-Hill & Jordan, in press). 
The idea that individuals can possess both explicit and implicit forms of self-esteem is 
supported, in part, by dual information processing models (Epstein & Morling, 1995; 
Smith & DeCoster, 2001; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) which suggest that 
individuals simultaneously process information on both a cognitive (i.e., rational, 
deliberative, and conscious) and experiential (i.e., affective, automatic, and 
nonconscious) basis. As such, it is thought that explicit self-esteem is a product of the 
cognitive system and that implicit self-esteem is likely a derivative of the experiential 
system (Zeigler-Hill & Jordan, in press). 
The measurement of implicit self-esteem does present some methodological 
challenges. Unlike direct measures of explicit self-esteem, individuals cannot simply be 
asked to report on their implicit self-esteem. Therefore, the nonreactive measures that 
attempt to capture implicit self-esteem typically rely on either association-based or 
indirect strategies (Karpinski & Steinberg, 2006). The association-based approach 
directly gauges the extent to which individuals associate themselves with positive or 
negative stimuli. For example, an association-based measure of implicit self-esteem such 
as the self-esteem version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald & Farnham, 
2000) uses reaction times to measure the degree to which individuals associate the self 
with positive or negative stimuli. The indirect approach, by contrast, compares 
individuals’ ratings of self-relevant stimuli to the ratings of other people. For example, an 
indirect measure of implicit self-esteem such as the Name-Letter Task (NLT; Nuttin, 
1985, 1987) gauges the extent to which individuals favor the letters of their names in 
comparison with other people.     
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Despite the advantages associated with the use of non-reactive self-esteem 
measures (e.g., possible avoidance of self-deception and impression management 
concerns), there are disadvantages as well (for a recent critique of the implicit self-esteem 
literature see Buhrmester, Blanton, & Swann, 2010). One important problem with 
nonreactive measures is that they have often been found to possess less than acceptable 
psychometric properties (Bosson, 2006a; Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000). For 
example, in a review of nonreactive measures, Bosson (2006a) found that only two 
measures – the Name-Letter Task (Nuttin, 1985, 1987) and the Implicit Association Test 
(Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) – possessed adequate psychometric properties. For the 
most part, nonreactive measures of self-esteem have shown low test-retest reliability as 
well as little or no correlation with each other (Bosson et al., 2000). The lack of 
convergent validity between measures of implicit self-esteem is particularly troublesome 
because different measures of the same underlying construct are expected to correlate 
with each other. One potential explanation for this lack of convergent validity may be 
that the various nonreactive measures are capturing different facets of implicit self-
esteem (Campbell, Bosson, Goheen, Lakey, & Kernis, 2007; Koole & Pelham, 2003; 
Sakellaropoulo & Baldwin, 2007). Despite this possibility, it remains unclear whether 
nonreactive measures truly capture wholly nonconscious attitudes (Fazio & Olson, 2003; 
Krizan, 2008). For example, it may be that some measures of implicit self-esteem may 
capture a combination of implicit and explicit self-esteem (Karpinski & Steinberg, 2006). 
Alternately, recent research has suggested that implicit self-esteem may not be implicit at 
all (Krizan, 2008). For example, in a test of the implicit nature of the Name-Letter Task, 
Krizan (2008) found many participants to be aware of the self-relevant nature of the task 
suggesting that individuals may have at least some awareness of their ‘implicit’ self-
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esteem. Taken together, the challenges associated with nonreactive measures of self-
esteem are serious but – despite these difficulties – they do offer the potential to obtain a 
more complete picture of an individual’s sense of self-worth. 
Discrepancies between Explicit and Implicit Self-Esteem 
 The advent of nonreactive measures has allowed the comparison of implicit and 
explicit forms of self-esteem within the same individual. As such, individuals may 
possess self-esteem that is either congruent (i.e., low explicit and low implicit; high 
explicit and high implicit) or discrepant (i.e., low explicit but high implicit; high explicit 
but low implicit). It is not uncommon for individuals to possess discrepancies between 
their implicit and explicit self-esteem (Bosson et al., 2003; Jordan et al., 2003; Zeigler-
Hill, 2006; Zeigler-Hill & Jordan, in press). For example, it is possible for individuals to 
possess low levels of explicit self-esteem and high levels of implicit self-esteem (i.e., 
discrepant low self-esteem). Relatively little research has focused on discrepant low self-
esteem, but there is some evidence that this form of discrepant self-esteem may be 
problematic for individuals because it is indicative of a non-integrated self-concept 
(Epstein & Morling, 1995; Schröder-Abé, Rudolph, Wiesner & Schütz, 2007).  
The form of discrepant self-esteem that has received the most empirical attention 
is that of discrepant high self-esteem (Bosson et al., 2003; Jordan et al., 2003). 
Individuals who possess this form of discrepant self-esteem possess high levels of 
explicit self-esteem and low levels of implicit self-esteem. It is thought that these 
individuals may wear a façade of positive self-worth in order to mask their underlying 
feelings of diminished self-worth (Bosson et al., 2003; Jordan et al., 2003). For this 
reason, individuals with discrepant high self-esteem are thought to possess explicit self-
esteem that – despite its outward appearance – is actually fragile and easily threatened 
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(Bosson et al., 2003; Jordan et al., 2003). In support of this idea, past research has shown 
that discrepant high self-esteem is associated with both self-enhancement (Bosson et al., 
2003) and self-protective behaviors (Jordan et al., 2003). In addition, discrepant high self-
esteem has been linked with greater self-esteem instability (Zeigler-Hill, 2006), defensive 
behavior (Kernis, Lakey, & Heppner, 2008; Schröder-Abé et al., 2007), and has 
sometimes – but not always – been found to correlate with narcissism (for reviews see 
Bosson et al., 2008 or Zeigler-Hill & Myers, 2008).     
Fragile Self-Esteem 
  Individuals with discrepant high self-esteem – because they possess self-esteem 
that is positive yet easily threatened – are considered to possess a form of fragile self-
esteem (Kernis, 2003). Fragile self-esteem is defined as a positive sense of self-worth that 
is vulnerable to challenge, needs frequent outside validation, and often requires some 
degree of self-deception in order to be maintained (Kernis, 2003). In contrast, secure self-
esteem is defined as a positive sense of self-worth that is realistic, well-anchored, and 
resistant to threat (Kernis, 2003). It appears that high self-esteem is a heterogeneous 
category consisting of individuals with both secure and fragile forms of self-esteem, 
perhaps helping to explain why high self-esteem is related to both positive and negative 
life outcomes (Baumeister et al., 2003). Unlike individuals with secure high self-esteem, 
individuals who possess fragile self-esteem tend to employ self-defensive and self-
enhancement strategies in order to protect their positive – yet vulnerable – feelings of 
self-worth (Kernis, 2003; Kernis et al., 2008). For example, these individuals tend to 
exhibit enhanced sensitivity to evaluative events (Crocker, Sommers, & Luhtanen, 2002), 
greater fluctuations in mood (Kernis et al., 1993), over-reliance on social sources of 
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evaluation (Greenier et al., 1999; Patrick, Neighbors, & Knee, 2004), as well as greater 
hostility and anger (Kernis et al., 1989). 
  In addition to the self-esteem discrepancy model of self-esteem (Bosson et al., 
2003; Jordan et al., 2003), fragile self-esteem may also be conceptualized in terms of 
self-esteem instability (Kernis et al., 1993) and contingent self-esteem (Crocker & Wolfe, 
2001; Deci & Ryan, 1995). The instability model of fragile self-esteem (for a review see 
Kernis, 2005) assesses the extent to which an individual’s state self-esteem fluctuates on 
a day-to-day basis in order to characterize an individual’s self-esteem as fragile (i.e., 
greater levels of fluctuation) or secure (i.e., lower levels of fluctuation). Individuals who 
possess unstable self-esteem may be at risk for a variety of negative outcomes. For 
example, these individuals may be more prone to experiencing depression in response to 
ordinary hassles (Kernis, Paradise, Whitaker,Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000). Individuals 
with unstable self-esteem may also be hypersensitive to social feedback such that they 
tend to experience greater reactivity to both positive and negative events (Greenier et al., 
1999). In other words, these individuals may hold feelings of self-worth that are 
constantly ‘on-the-line’ and, therefore, quite influenced by daily events – both positive 
and negative. In addition, individuals who possess unstable self-esteem have been shown 
to possess an impoverished self-concept (Kernis et al., 2000; Zeigler-Hill & Showers, 
2007), engage in a greater degree of verbal defensiveness (Kernis et al., 2008), and 
employ more immature defenses (Myers & Zeigler-Hill, 2008; Zeigler-Hill, Chadha, & 
Osterman, 2008) than those with stable self-esteem.   
The contingency model of self-esteem (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Deci & Ryan, 
1995) assesses the extent to which individuals base their self-worth on meeting internal 
or external standards that are highly sensitive to successes or failures in specific, self-
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relevant domains in order to characterize an individual’s self-esteem as fragile (i.e., 
higher levels of contingency) or secure (i.e., lower levels of contingency). Self-esteem 
contingency may be conceptualized at either the domain-specific (Crocker & Wolfe, 
2001) or global levels (Deci & Ryan, 1995; Kernis, 2003). The domain-specific approach 
to contingent self-esteem assesses individual differences in the degree to which 
individuals base their self-esteem on specific areas of their lives (e.g., appearance, 
academic competence). Individuals who possess self-esteem that is contingent on a 
particular domain may experience negative outcomes when they do not meet their own 
standards. For example, students who based their self-worth on the domain of academic 
competence tended to experience declines in their overall global self-esteem after 
receiving rejection letters from graduate schools (Crocker et al., 2002). In addition, 
Crocker and Park (2004) found that individuals who based their self-worth on gaining the 
approval of others experienced a greater degree of relationship problems, perhaps 
because they sought excessive reassurance from their partners and interpreted ambiguous 
information in a negative light.  
The global approach to self-esteem contingency, by contrast, assesses individual 
differences in the overall degree to which individuals base their self-esteem on meeting 
internal or external standards. In other words, individuals who possess this form of self-
esteem contingency may show a general tendency to base their feelings of self-worth on 
meeting standards (Kernis & Goldman, 2006). As such, individuals who possess a more 
generalized form of self-esteem contingency may be especially attuned to social 
comparisons in order to gauge whether or not they ‘measure up.’ For example, 
individuals with highly contingent self-esteem tended to experience increased negative 
affect when compared to others (Patrick et al., 2004). Reflecting the idea that their self-
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worth is constantly at stake, individuals with highly contingent self-esteem have been 
shown to engage in a greater degree of verbal defensiveness (Kernis et al., 2008). 
Additionally – perhaps stemming from the stress that may go along with constantly 
comparing oneself to others – individuals with highly contingent self-esteem may be 
more likely to abuse alcohol (Neighbors, Larimer, Markman-Geisner, & Knee, 2004).  
What is Self-Esteem For? 
The existence of fragile self-esteem highlights the fact that people seem to be 
interested in claiming to possess high levels of self-esteem – even when they may not 
actually possess such positive feelings about themselves. In order to gain a clearer 
understanding of why people are so attuned to self-esteem, it may be helpful to examine 
the functions of self-esteem. One function of self-esteem may simply be to provide 
individuals with the intrapsychic tools they need to successfully navigate the world. High 
self-esteem has been shown to be associated with intrapsychic benefits such that 
individuals with higher levels of self-esteem are more likely to possess the ability to feel 
good about themselves (Diener & Diener, 1995), deal with life’s challenges (Taylor & 
Brown, 1988), and feel that they are valued by others (Keefe & Berndt, 1996). 
Considering the inherently rewarding nature of these advantages, it is easy to understand 
why individuals may be interested in possessing high levels of self-esteem. What is less 
clear, however, is why individuals may sometimes want to create the impression of 
having high self-esteem (Raskin et al., 1991).  
In order to better understand why individuals may want to create the impression 
of possessing high self-esteem, it may be helpful to consider both the interpersonal nature 
of self-esteem and the interpersonal benefits that often accompany the possession of high 
levels of self-esteem. As was first suggested by Cooley (1902) and later extended by 
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Mead (1913), individuals may come to define themselves based on the impressions that 
others have of them (i.e., the looking-glass self). In other words, an individual who is 
perceived by others in a positive light may come to incorporate the positive impressions 
of others into one’s own self-concept. According to this perspective, it would be 
advantageous for individuals to cultivate a positive appearance in order to reap the 
personal benefits that may arise out of others’ positive evaluations. Therefore, creating 
the appearance of high self-esteem may be one way for individuals to accomplish this 
goal.   
Individuals may also be interested in creating the impression of possessing high 
self-esteem in order to gain interpersonal advantages. That is, self-esteem may hold 
important consequences for interpersonal functioning (Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 2001, 2006). 
For example, it is thought that self-esteem may have evolved out of the fundamental 
human need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) such that it serves a status-tracking 
function.1 In other words, self-esteem may allow individuals to monitor their social value 
on both a short- and long-term basis (i.e., sociometer theory; Leary & Downs, 1995). 
Considering the evolutionary advantages associated with group inclusion (e.g., greater 
chance of survival), the evolution of a status-tracking system appears to serve an 
important interpersonal function. According to sociometer theory, self-esteem functions 
much like the gas gauge on the dashboard of an automobile such that higher levels of 
self-esteem are reflective of social inclusion whereas lower levels of self-esteem are  
 
1
 It should also be noted that an alternate theory regarding the function of self-esteem is Terror 
Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1992; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, 
Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). TMT suggests that self-esteem allows individuals to reduce the 
existential anxiety that results from the uniquely human knowledge that death is forthcoming. In addition, 
TMT posits that individuals gain self-esteem by meeting cultural expectations. TMT has been supported by 
research showing that when individuals are reminded of their mortality, their striving for self-esteem 
generally increases (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2005).  
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reflective of social exclusion (Bourgeois & Leary, 2001; Leary, 1999; Leary, Cottrell, &  
Phillips, 2001; Leary & Downs, 1995; Leary, Haupt, Strausser, & Chokel, 1998; Leary & 
MacDonald, 2003; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995; Nezlek, Kowalski, Leary,  
Blevins, & Holgate, 1997). For example, when the gas gauge on an automobile shows 
that the level of fuel in the tank is low, individuals must act to refill the tank or risk 
becoming stranded on the highway. In much the same fashion, individuals who 
experience low levels of state self-esteem should be alerted to strive for social acceptance 
so that they may avoid the possibility of becoming ostracized from their social support 
networks.    
Expanding on sociometer theory, Kirkpatrick and Ellis (2001, 2006) proposed the 
idea of multiple sociometers that serve a status-tracking function across a variety of 
interpersonal domains rather than focusing solely on a global form of relational value. 
According to this extension of the basic sociometer model, individuals may be able to use 
self-esteem – not only to monitor relational value – but also to gauge their value as a 
potential mate or monitor their rank within a social group. Taking mate value as an 
example, consider the cost in terms of time and resources of attracting the highest quality 
mate possible. Being able to accurately perceive one’s own value as a mate may prevent 
the loss of valuable resources in the search for a mate of equivalent value. In other words, 
no time is wasted in pursuit of a mate that is out of one’s league or, by the same token, 
one does not select a lower-quality mate than one may be capable of attracting. This 
notion has been supported by research showing that self-esteem may be a good indicator 
of an individual’s value as a mate (Brase & Guy, 2004; Dawkins, 1982; Kenrick, Groth, 
Trost, & Sadalla, 1993; Kiesler & Baral, 1970; Shackelford, 2001; Tooby & Cosmides, 
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1990; Trivers, 1972; Wright, 1994; Zeigler-Hill, 2010; Zeigler-Hill, Campe, & Myers, 
2009). 
It is also thought that self-esteem may have evolved to aid individuals as they 
monitor their rank within social dominance hierarchies (Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 2001, 2006). 
Because individuals must enact different strategies depending on their rank, it is 
important that they accurately perceive their place in the dominance hierarchy in order to 
make appropriate behavioral choices. For example, in the evolutionary past it may have 
been necessary for lower-ranking individuals to devise ways to attain everything from 
food to mating opportunities without openly infringing on the domains of higher-ranking 
individuals. Conversely, higher-ranking individuals may have been attuned to 
maintaining and defending their positions in the social hierarchy. Supporting the notion 
that self-esteem may be indicative of an individual’s position in the dominance hierarchy, 
self-esteem has been shown to be associated with dominance (Barkow, 1989; Gilbert, 
Price, & Allan, 1995; Zeigler-Hill, in press).  
Despite some evidence linking dominance and self-esteem, it has been suggested 
that people may be even more attuned to prestige than they are to dominance (Henrich & 
Gil-White, 2001). In contrast to dominance – which is maintained by force – prestige is a 
more refined and evolved form of social dominance in which others recognize the special 
skills, knowledge, or achievements of others. Individuals then seek to associate with 
these high prestige individuals in order to attain social benefits by nature of association 
(Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). It follows that in order to maintain high prestige, 
individuals must make appropriate behavioral decisions that will attract lower-ranking 
individuals who hope to learn or gain something by being associated with the higher 
prestige individual. Research has supported the idea that self-esteem may indicate an 
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individual’s level of prestige. One study showed that participants with lower levels of 
self-esteem chose to affiliate with participants scoring significantly higher on self-esteem 
and that, conversely, participants with higher levels of self-esteem chose to affiliate with 
participants scoring significantly lower on self-esteem (Astra & Singg, 2000). Another 
study showed that compared to individuals with lower levels of self-esteem, individuals 
with higher levels of self-esteem expressed greater confidence that being friendly would 
result in affiliative responses from others (Baldwin & Keelan, 1999).  
In addition to serving a status-tracking function that allows individuals to monitor 
their social standing across a variety of domains, self-esteem may also have status-
signaling properties that transfer information about individuals to the social environment 
(Zeigler-Hill, 2010; Zeigler-Hill & Myers, 2009). As a complement to status-tracking 
models of self-esteem (i.e., sociometer theory; Leary & Downs, 1995), the status-
signaling model of self-esteem proposes that an individual’s level of self-esteem provides 
information to the social environment that may, in turn, influence perceptions of the 
individual. In other words, by sending signals to the social environment regarding their 
status, individuals may influence the ways in which they are perceived by those who 
comprise their social environment. For example, research has shown that individuals who 
appear to possess higher levels of self-esteem are generally viewed more positively by 
others on domains concerning romantic desirability (Zeigler-Hill, 2010) and political 
competence (Zeigler-Hill & Myers, 2009). As such, individuals may sometimes attempt 
to create an overly positive impression of themselves in order to take advantage of the 
interpersonal benefits associated with the appearance of high self-esteem.    
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Overview and Predictions 
Despite the abundance of past research examining self-esteem, one question that 
has remained unanswered is whether the high levels of self-esteem some individuals 
claim to possess accurately reflect their authentic self-evaluations. This may be especially 
true for individuals who possess feelings of self-worth that – despite being overtly 
positive – are easily threatened (i.e., fragile self-esteem; Kernis, 2003). As such, the 
present study was conducted in order to improve our understanding of whether 
individuals with fragile high self-esteem sometimes report higher levels of self-esteem 
than they actually possess. In order to accomplish this goal and to improve the likelihood 
that individuals would answer questions about their self-worth more honestly, the present 
study utilized the bogus-pipeline technique (Jones & Sigall, 1971; Sigall & Page, 1971). 
This technique generally involves the use of physiological equipment – such as a lie 
detector – that ostensibly allows the researcher to know if individuals are responding 
truthfully or not. Therefore, it is assumed that individuals – believing that the 
experimenter has access to their true attitudes – will respond more honestly (Jones & 
Sigall, 1971; Sigall & Page, 1971). This technique has been used successfully in past 
research (Alexander & Fisher, 2003; Boysen, et al., 2006; Roese & Jamieson, 1993) to 
examine topics that may elicit a strong social desirability bias in participant responses 
(e.g., sexual behaviors, prejudice based on race and sexual orientation) and was used in 
the present study in order to gain a better understanding of the ways in which individuals 
feel about themselves.  
It was predicted that – relative to individuals with secure high self-esteem – 
individuals with fragile high self-esteem would report more moderate levels of explicit 
self-esteem under bogus pipeline conditions. That is, it was predicted that the bogus 
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pipeline manipulation would break through what may be a façade of high self-esteem that 
these individuals use to manage the impressions that others have of them (i.e., impression 
management; Paulhus, 1984, 2002; Raskin et al., 1991). There are several reasons why 
this impression management hypothesis seemed more likely than other potential 
explanations (e.g., self-deception, emotional lability). First, it seemed likely that the 
socially desirable nature of high self-esteem may influence individuals to present 
themselves as if they possess high self-esteem even if they do not (Baumeister et al., 
2003; Paulhus, 1984, 2002; Raskin et al., 1991). In doing so, individuals may be able to 
create the appearance of conforming to a valued cultural ideal and may stand to reap 
social benefits such as being viewed more positively by others (Zeigler-Hill & Myers, 
2009). Second, it seemed likely that individuals may be interested in creating the 
impression of possessing high self-esteem in order to improve their lot within the social 
hierarchy (e.g., increased social standing, ease in finding a mate; Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 
2001, 2006; Leary & Downs, 1995). Finally, it seemed that in addition to trying to 
manage the impressions that others have of them, individuals may be trying to manage 
their own impressions of themselves. According to Trivers (2000), in order to 
successfully deceive others, an individual must first believe his or her own “act”. In 
reporting higher levels of self-esteem than they actually possess, individuals may be, in 
essence, strengthening their act by making it more believable to themselves. This may, in 
turn, make their act more believable to others. In putting on a convincing performance, 
these individuals may be more likely to achieve the dual goals of (a) convincing others 
that they possess the high levels of self-esteem that they say they do and (b) not being 
exposed as a fake. Reporting high levels of self-worth on direct measures of self-esteem – 
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even when they do not accurately reflect one’s genuine self-evaluation – may be one way 
for individuals to accomplish these goals.   
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CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY  
Participants and Procedure for Phase One 
Participants for Phase One were 449 undergraduates (76 men, 373 women) 
recruited from the subject pool at The University of Southern Mississippi. The mean age 
of participants was 22.07 years (SD = 5.99) and the racial/ethnic composition was 54% 
White, 33% Black, and 13% Other. Participants received partial fulfillment of a research 
participation requirement in exchange for their participation.  
 Participants completed internet-based measures of demographics (i.e., age, 
gender, racial/ethnic background, marital status), explicit self-esteem (i.e., Rosenberg 
Self-Esteem Scale; Rosenberg, 1965), implicit self-esteem (i.e., Name-Letter Task; 
Nuttin, 1985, 1987), contingent self-esteem (i.e., Contingent Self-Esteem Scale; Paradise 
& Kernis, 1999), and other measures that were not relevant to the present study. At the 
completion of the 60-minute session, participants were given instructions for completing 
a brief measure of state self-esteem each evening for seven consecutive days in order to 
create an index of self-esteem instability (Kernis et al., 1989).   
Phase One Measures 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; 
Rosenberg, 1965) is a widely used 10-item measure of global self-esteem (e.g., “I take a 
positive attitude toward myself”). Respondents were asked to provide ratings of 
agreement based on how they generally feel about themselves on scales ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Past research has demonstrated the construct 
validity and reliability of the RSES (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991; Demo, 1985; 
Rosenberg, 1965; Silber & Tippett, 1965) with test-retest correlations ranging from .82 to 
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.88 and Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .77 to .88 (Blascovich & Tomaka, 1991; 
Rosenberg, 1986). For Phase One of the present study, the internal consistency of the 
RSES was .88.   
Name-Letter Task.  The Name-Letter Task (NLT; Nuttin, 1985, 1987) is a 26-item 
measure of implicit self-esteem. Participants were asked to evaluate how much they like 
each letter of the alphabet by responding on scales ranging from 1 (I dislike this letter 
very much) to 7 (I like this letter very much). This measure of implicit self-esteem is 
based on the ‘mere ownership effect’ which refers to the idea that an individual’s positive 
self-evaluations will spill over onto other self-relevant objects (Zajonc, 1968). More 
specifically, research has shown that individuals may tend to show a preference for the 
letters than represent their own initials (Nuttin, 1985, 1987). The extent to which 
participants evaluate their own initials more positively than other participants evaluate 
the same letters is thought to be indicative of implicit self-esteem. The NLT has been 
shown to possess acceptable levels of reliability and validity (Bosson et al., 2000; Jones, 
Pelham, Mirenberg, & Hetts, 2002; Koole, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2001; 
Koole & Pelham, 2003; Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Shimizu 
& Pelham, 2004). In accordance with past research (e.g., Kernis et al., 2008; Zeigler-Hill, 
2006), the significant positive correlation between the preference for the first and last 
initial serves as a measure of internal consistency for the NLT (r = .28, p <.05).       
Contingent Self-Esteem Scale. The Contingent Self-Esteem Scale (CSES; 
Paradise & Kernis, 1999) is a 15-item measure of general self-esteem contingency (e.g., 
“When my actions do not live up to my expectations, it makes me feel dissatisfied with 
myself”). Participants were asked to respond on scales ranging from 1 (not at all like me) 
to 5 (very much like me). The CSES has been shown to be a reliable and valid measure of 
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contingent self-esteem (Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Neighbors et al., 2004; Patrick et al., 
2004). For the present sample, the internal consistency of the CSES was .73.    
State self-esteem and self-esteem instability. The method for measuring self-
esteem instability was adapted from the procedure developed by Kernis and his 
colleagues (for a review see Kernis, 2005). Participants were asked to complete a 
modified version of the RSES each evening at approximately 10 p.m. for 7 consecutive 
days via the internet. The RSES was modified to measure state self-esteem by instructing 
the participant to give the response that best reflected how he or she felt at the moment 
the form was completed. Responses were made on scales ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). An index of self-esteem instability was created by 
evaluating the within-subject standard deviation across repeated assessments of state self-
esteem such that higher standard deviations reflect higher levels of self-esteem instability. 
This measure has been shown to possess convergent validity with other measures of 
fragile self-esteem (Kernis et al., 2008). For the present sample, the significant 
correlation between level of self-esteem (i.e., RSES) and self-esteem instability (r = -.45, 
p < .01) is consistent with past research (e.g., Kernis et al., 1989; Kernis et al., 2008; 
Zeigler-Hill, 2006).   
Participants and Procedure for Phase Two 
All Phase One participants were invited to take part in Phase Two of the present 
study. Participants for Phase Two were 79 undergraduates (8 men, 71 women) with a 
mean age of 21.74 years (SD = 4.46). The racial/ethnic composition was 42% White, 
45% Black, and 13% Other. All Phase Two participants received additional credit toward 
the fulfillment of a research participation requirement in exchange for their participation. 
Independent t-tests showed that the Phase Two sample did not significantly differ 
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from the Phase One sample on any of the following personality and demographic 
variables: Explicit Self-Esteem, t (441) = .29, ns; Implicit Self-Esteem, t (436) = 1.03, ns; 
Contingent Self-Esteem, t (435) = 1.41, ns; and Age, t (435) = .54, ns. However, these 
analyses did reveal differences between the laboratory sample and the Phase One sample 
on the demographic variables of race, t (94.08) = 2.45, p < .05, and gender, t (138.27) = 
2.08, p < .05, such that the laboratory sample included a greater proportion of Black and 
female participants. Despite these differences between the Phase One and Phase Two 
participants, the inclusion of race and gender in the preliminary analyses did not qualify 
any of the results for the present study. As a result, race and gender will not be discussed 
further. 
The first 50 Phase Two participants were randomly assigned to either the bogus 
pipeline or control condition. The remaining participants were assigned to these 
conditions based on race and gender in an effort to achieve roughly equal groups with 
respect to these attributes. Out of the 79 participants who completed Phase Two, there 
were 38 participants (3 men, 35 women) in the control condition. The racial/ethnic 
composition of the control condition was 45% White, 47% Black, and 8% Other. In the 
bogus pipeline condition, there were 41 participants (5 men, 36 women). The 
racial/ethnic composition of the bogus pipeline condition was 39% White, 42% Black, 
and 19% Other.   
Preliminary analyses using the Phase Two sample of 79 participants revealed that 
4 participants had extreme scores (i.e., greater than 2 standard deviations below the 
mean) on Phase One measures of Self-Esteem (i.e., Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and 
Name-Letter Task). As a result, these participants were excluded from the final implicit 
and contingent self-esteem analyses which were conducted using the remaining sample of 
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75 participants (7 men, 68 women). These participants had a mean age of 21.80 years (SD 
= 4.56), and the racial/ethnic composition was 43% White, 44% Black, and 13% Other. 
For the self-esteem instability analysis, 27 additional participants were excluded due to 
failure to complete three or more daily measures of state self-esteem. The remaining 48 
participants (5 men, 43 women) had a mean age of 22.26 years (SD = 5.18) and the 
racial/ethnic composition was 40% White, 44% Black, and 16% Other.   
Laboratory Procedure 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were greeted by a White female 
researcher wearing a standard white lab coat. Participants were also introduced to one of 
four White female undergraduate research assistants. After providing informed consent, 
participants were seated at a computer station and asked to complete the self-esteem 
version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000).  
Bogus-pipeline condition. After completing the self-esteem IAT, participants in 
the bogus pipeline condition were told that for the next task, they would be monitored by 
lie-detecting physiological equipment.2 Participants were also informed that they would 
be videotaped in order to analyze their nonverbal behavior for signs of deception. The 
researcher then stated that the undergraduate research assistant would be monitoring the 
results from a computer station located directly adjacent to the laboratory and escorted 
each participant into a small room containing physiological testing equipment (i.e., 
galvanic skin response equipment, automatic blood pressure monitor, and Grass Model 
78D Polygraph machine). Participants were seated in a recliner as the researcher applied  
electrode paste to the finger cuffs and explained the general procedure. The researcher 
 
 
2 It should be noted that no physiological measurements were actually collected or recorded in either 
condition. 
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then affixed the finger cuffs as well as a blood pressure cuff. Participants were then 
restrained using arm straps ostensibly to avoid any excessive movement, and the recliner 
was moved to the fully reclining position. Participants were then asked several questions 
for the ostensible purpose of checking to make sure the equipment was functioning 
properly. For example, participants were first asked obvious questions and instructed to 
respond truthfully (e.g., “What is your name?”, “How old are you?”). Participants were 
then asked obvious questions and instructed to lie (e.g., “What color is my lab coat?”, 
“Are you male or female?”). After each question was answered, the researcher left the 
room to briefly consult with the undergraduate research assistant seated at the outside 
computer station. After having created the impression that the physiological equipment 
was functioning correctly, participants were again reminded that their physiological 
measurements were being collected for the express purpose of assessing their potential 
misrepresentation of attitudes (e.g., “We will be able to tell if you are lying”). From the 
computer station adjacent to the laboratory, the undergraduate research assistant then 
started the PowerPoint presentation containing the questionnaire items. After turning the 
lights off and starting the video camera, the researcher sat behind the participant and used 
a remote presenter to control the projection of the questionnaire items directly onto the 
laboratory wall. Participants were then instructed to read and respond out loud to the 
following measures of explicit self-esteem: Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 
1965), State Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991), Self-Liking/Self-
Competence Scale (Tafarodi & Swann, 2001), and Self-Attributes Questionnaire (Pelham 
& Swann, 1989). For exploratory purposes, participants in the laboratory were also asked 
to respond to measures of implicit self-esteem (NLT; Nuttin, 1985, 1987) and affect 
(Positive and Negative Affect Scale; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The researcher 
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then recorded the responses of participants to each item on a standardized response sheet. 
After the measures were completed, participants were led through a funnel-style 
debriefing (e.g., “Did you ever have a sense that there was more to this study than we 
were telling you?”) and thanked for their participation. 
Control condition. In accordance with past research (Boysen et al., 2006), the 
control condition was designed to be nearly identical to the bogus pipeline procedure 
differing only by the nature of the cover story. More specifically, participants in the 
control condition were told that they would be connected to the physiological equipment 
in order to allow the researcher to gain practice in connecting participants to the 
physiological equipment and to test whether participants have any difficulty completing 
tasks while restrained. After successfully connecting participants to the physiological 
equipment, the researcher then clearly deactivated the physiological equipment (i.e., “I 
am turning the equipment off now”) and reminded participants that their physiological 
data was not being collected or recorded in any way. Additionally, participants were told 
that the session would be videotaped for the purpose of allowing the researcher to review 
laboratory procedures.     
Phase Two Measures 
Implicit Association Test. The self-esteem Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) assesses implicit self-esteem by engaging participants in a 
computerized categorization task that measures automatic associations of self-relevant 
(e.g., myself, mine, me) and non-self-relevant words (e.g., other, them, their) with 
pleasant (e.g., sunshine, smile, happy) and unpleasant words (e.g., grief, tragedy, 
sickness). Participants were asked to categorize target words that appeared in the center 
of their computer screens. There were seven blocks of trials consisting of both practice 
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and judgment trials in which participants were asked to make single (e.g., pleasant vs. 
not-pleasant) and combined categorizations (e.g., self and pleasant vs. not-self and 
unpleasant). Participants were asked to make both congruent (i.e., self and pleasant vs. 
not-self and unpleasant) and incongruent (self and unpleasant vs. not-self and pleasant) 
categorizations. The Inquisit computer program (Millisecond Software, 2000) controlled 
the random presentation of items, order of blocks, and recording of response latencies. 
IAT scores reflect the ease with which participants associate pleasant versus unpleasant 
words with the self. The IAT has been shown to possess adequate psychometric 
properties including acceptable test-retest reliability (Bosson et al., 2000; Greenwald & 
Farnham, 2000; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003).   
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. For Phase Two of the present study, the internal 
consistency of the RSES was .83. 
State Self-Esteem Scale. The State Self-Esteem Scale (SSES; Heatherton & 
Polivy, 1991) is a 20-item measure of self-esteem designed to capture momentary 
fluctuations in feelings of self-worth that relate to the domains of performance (e.g., “At 
this moment, I feel frustrated or rattled about my performance”), social (e.g., “At this 
moment, I feel that others respect and admire me”), and appearance self-esteem (e.g., “At 
this moment, I feel unattractive”). Respondents were asked to provide ratings of 
agreement based on their present feelings on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(extremely).The SSES has been shown to be a valid and reliable measure of state self-
esteem (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). For the present sample, the internal consistency of 
the SSES was high (α = .89).   
Self-Liking/Self-Competence Scale. The Self-Liking/Self-Competence Scale 
(SLSC; Tafarodi & Swann, 2001) is a 16-item measure of global self-esteem that 
31  
captures the domains of self-liking (e.g., “I feel great about who I am”) and self-
competence (e.g., “I perform very well at many things”). Respondents were asked to 
provide ratings of agreement on scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). The SLSC has been shown to possess adequate psychometric properties including 
convergent and discriminant validity (Tafarodi & Swann, 2001). For the present sample, 
the internal consistency of the SLSC was .89. 
Self-Attributes Questionnaire. The Self-Attributes Questionnaire (SAQ; Pelham & 
Swann, 1989) is a 24-item measure of self-attributes consisting of three subscales (i.e., 
self-attributes, ideal attributes, and personal importance of attributes). The present study 
utilized the first subscale of 8-items designed to assess attitudes regarding personal 
activities and abilities (e.g., common sense, social skills/social competence). Respondents 
were asked to rate themselves relative to other students of their sex and age on scales 
ranging from 0 (way below average) to 9 (way above average). For the present sample, 
the internal consistency of the SAQ was .70. 
Laboratory session composite of explicit self-esteem. A total explicit self-esteem 
composite score was created to serve as a total measure of explicit self-esteem during the 
laboratory session. 3 In order to create the composite, standardized values were obtained 
for the score totals of the RSES, SSES, SLSC, and SAQ (rs > .42, p < .001). A mean 
score was then calculated with higher scores reflecting higher Phase Two Explicit Self- 
Esteem (α = .80). 
 
 
 
 
 
3Analyses predicting the RSES alone were consistent with the results obtained using the total composite 
measure of explicit self-esteem. 
32  
CHAPTER III 
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics, internal consistency coefficients, and 
intercorrelations for the measures in the present study.  
 
Table 1 
 
Intercorrelations and Descriptive Statistics for Explicit Self-Esteem Level (Phase One), 
Implicit Self-Esteem, Contingent Self-Esteem, Self Esteem Instability, and Explicit Self-
Esteem Level (Phase Two). 
 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Note. The intercorrelations are presented above (Bogus Pipeline) and below (Control) the 
diagonal for each experimental condition. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Explicit S.E.                
(Phase One)   
—  .31  .12   -.56***  -.53**  .43** 
2. Implicit S.E.              
(NLT) 
  .25 —   -.22 .00  -.16     .20 
3. Implicit S.E. 
(IAT) 
  .25  -.33  —  .03   -.05   .13 
4. Contingent S.E.  
 
   -.58***    -.12    -.02 —     .47*    -.29 
5. S.E. Instability 
 
-.36* .05 -.16 .22 — -.29 
6. Explicit S.E. 
(Phase Two) 
 .55***  .26  .27  -.12  -.04 — 
 
Control   
(N=36) 
          
M  4.08   3.16   .90  3.25   .43   .20 
SD  .70    1.80   .48   .56  .29  .75 
Minimum 2.80  -1.50  .07 1.93 .00 -1.47 
Maximum 5.00 5.50 1.70 4.40 1.06 1.47 
 
Bogus Pipeline 
(N=39) 
          
M  3.99   2.35   .96  3.24   .54   -.06 
SD  .70    1.80   .42   .53  .34  .74 
Minimum 2.70  -1.57 -.02 2.20 .08 -1.43 
Maximum 5.00 5.06 1.71 4.47 1.13 1.54 
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Data Analytic Strategy 
A series of hierarchical multiple regressions were performed to examine whether 
fragile self-esteem would moderate explicit self-esteem level during the laboratory 
session. In order to independently examine the effects for each marker of self-esteem 
fragility, separate regressions were performed for each marker of fragile self-esteem in 
the present study (i.e. implicit self-esteem, contingent self-esteem, and self-esteem 
instability). For each of these analyses, the continuous predictors were first centered on 
their respective means (Aiken & West, 1991). On Step 1 of these analyses, the following 
variables were entered: experimental condition (0 = control, 1 = bogus pipeline), explicit 
self-esteem level (Phase One) and fragility marker score. The two-way interactions of the 
main effect terms were entered on Step 2 and the three-way interaction was entered on 
Step 3. These regression analyses were followed by the simple slopes tests recommended 
by Aiken and West (1991) in order to examine the patterns of the interactions emerging 
from these analyses.  
Implicit Self-Esteem 
Tables 2 and 3 present the results for the analyses examining the moderating role 
of implicit self-esteem in conjunction with Phase One self-esteem and experimental 
condition on Phase Two self-esteem. Due to the lack of convergence between the two 
measures of implicit self-esteem used in the present study (r = -.28, p < .05), a separate        
regression analysis was performed for each measure. The results for the NLT analysis are 
presented in Table 2, and the results for the IAT analysis are presented in Table 3.  
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Table 2 
 
Analysis Regressing Explicit Self-Esteem (Phase Two) onto Experimental 
Condition, Explicit Self-Esteem (Phase One), and Implicit Self-Esteem as  
Measured by the Name-Letter Task. 
 
 Explicit Self-Esteem (Phase Two) 
  Cumulative  
R2 
Increase in  
R2 
 
β 
Step 1   .27***  .27***   
Condition    -.12 
Explicit S.E. (Phase One)    .45*** 
Implicit S.E. (NLT)      .10 
      
Step 2  .28**  .01   
Condition x Explicit S.E.  
(Phase One) 
        -.08 
Condition x Implicit S.E. (NLT)       -.04 
Explicit S.E. (Phase One) x  
Implicit S.E. (NLT) 
   .02 
       
Step 3  .37***  .09**   
Condition x Explicit S.E.  
(Phase One) x Implicit S.E. (NLT) 
     .46** 
 
 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Name-Letter Task  
 For this analysis, a main effect emerged for Phase One explicit self-esteem (β = 
.45, p < .001) such that individuals with higher levels of explicit self-esteem during Phase 
One of the study were more likely to report higher levels of explicit self-esteem during 
Phase Two of the study. This main effect for self-esteem was qualified by the three-way 
interaction between experimental condition, explicit self-esteem (Phase One) and NLT (β 
= .46, p < .01). The predicted values for this interaction are shown in Figure 1. Simple 
slopes tests indicated that participants in the bogus pipeline condition were more likely to 
report lower levels of explicit self-esteem during the laboratory session when they 
possessed high levels of explicit self-esteem at Phase One in conjunction with low levels 
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of implicit self-esteem (β = .51, p < .05). In other words, participants with fragile high 
self-esteem tended to report lower levels of explicit self-esteem when they believed that 
the researcher had access to their true feelings. As further evidence of this effect, simple 
slopes tests revealed that in comparison to the control condition, individuals with 
discrepant high self-esteem were more likely to report lower levels of self-esteem in the 
bogus pipeline condition (β = -.62, p < .05). The remaining slopes failed to reach 
conventional levels of significance (βs < .32, ns). 
 
Figure 1. Name-Letter Task. 
Note. Adjusted predicted values for explicit self-esteem level (Phase Two), illustrating the three-way 
interaction of experimental condition, explicit self-esteem (Phase One), and NLT at values that are one 
standard deviation above and below their respective means. 
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Table 3 
 
Analysis Regressing Explicit Self-Esteem (Phase Two) onto Experimental  
Condition, Explicit Self-Esteem (Phase One), and Implicit Self-Esteem as  
Measured by the Implicit Association Test. 
 
 Explicit Self-Esteem (Phase Two) 
  Cumulative  
R2 
Increase in  
R2 
 
β 
Step 1   .27***  .27***   
Condition    -.15 
Explicit S.E. (Phase One)    .46*** 
Implicit S.E. (IAT)      .11 
      
Step 2  .28**  .01   
Condition x Explicit S.E.  
(Phase One) 
       -.09  
Condition x Implicit S.E. (IAT)       -.03 
Explicit S.E. (Phase One) x  
Implicit S.E. (IAT) 
   .05 
       
Step 3  .36***  .08**   
Condition x Explicit S.E.  
(Phase One) x Implicit S.E. (IAT) 
     -.39** 
 
 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
Implicit Association Test  
The results of this analysis also indicated a main effect for Phase One explicit 
self-esteem (β = .46, p < .001) which was qualified by the three-way interaction between 
experimental condition, explicit self-esteem (Phase One) and IAT (β = -.39, p < .01). The 
predicted values for this interaction are shown in Figure 2. In contrast to the results for 
the NLT, the simple slopes tests for the IAT indicated that participants in the control 
condition tended to report higher levels of explicit self-esteem during the laboratory 
session when they possessed high levels of explicit self-esteem at Phase One in 
conjunction with high levels of implicit self-esteem (β = .47, p < .05). These results are 
not surprising in that they reflect highly positive feelings of self-worth for participants 
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with secure high self-esteem in the control condition. Simple slopes tests also indicated a 
significant difference between the control and bogus pipeline conditions for these 
individuals (β = -.50, p < .05) such that individuals with secure high self-esteem were 
more likely to report higher levels of explicit self-esteem in the control condition. The 
remaining slopes failed to reach conventional levels of significance (βs < .33, ns). 
 
Figure 2. Implicit Association Test. 
Note. Adjusted predicted values for explicit self-esteem level (Phase Two), illustrating the three-way 
interaction of experimental condition, explicit self-esteem (Phase One), and IAT at values that are one 
standard deviation above and below their respective means. 
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Contingent Self-Esteem 
Table 4 presents the results for the analysis examining the moderating role of 
contingent self-esteem in conjunction with Phase One self-esteem and experimental 
condition on Phase Two self-esteem. A main effect emerged for self-esteem (β = .54, p < 
.001) such that individuals with higher levels of self-esteem during Phase One of the 
study were more likely to report higher levels of self-esteem during Phase Two of the 
study. This main effect was qualified by the emergence of a two-way interaction between 
self-esteem and contingent self-esteem (β = -.21, p < .05). Simple slopes tests revealed 
that contingent self-esteem was positively associated with explicit self-esteem during the 
laboratory session among individuals with low Phase One self-esteem (β = .37, p < .06). 
 
Table 4 
 
Analysis Regressing Explicit Self-Esteem (Phase Two) onto Experimental  
Condition, Explicit Self-Esteem (Phase One), and Contingent Self-Esteem. 
 
 Explicit Self-Esteem (Phase Two) 
  Cumulative  
R2 
Increase in  
R2 
 
β 
Step 1   .27***  .27***   
Condition    -.14 
Explicit S.E. (Phase One)    .54*** 
Contingent S.E.      .10 
      
Step 2  .34***  .07   
Condition x Explicit S.E.  
(Phase One) 
        -.28 
Condition x Contingent S.E.     -.31 
Explicit S.E. (Phase One) x  
Contingent S.E. 
   -.21* 
       
Step 3 .34***   .00   
Condition x Explicit S.E.  
(Phase One) x Contingent S.E. 
     .02 
  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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For individuals with high Phase One self-esteem, the association between contingent self-
esteem and explicit self-esteem during the laboratory session did not approach 
conventional levels of significance (β = -.04, ns). There were no further significant 
findings for the contingent self-esteem analysis. 
Self-Esteem Instability 
Table 5 presents the results for the analysis examining the moderating role of self-
esteem instability in conjunction with Phase One self-esteem and experimental condition 
on Phase Two self-esteem. The self-esteem instability analysis revealed a main effect for 
participants’ level of self-esteem at Phase One was a strong indicator of their self-esteem 
level at Phase Two. The self-esteem instability analysis yielded no further results. 
 
Table 5 
 
Analysis Regressing Explicit Self-Esteem (Phase Two) onto Experimental  
Condition, Explicit Self-Esteem (Phase One), and Self-Esteem Instability. 
 
 Explicit Self-Esteem (Phase Two) 
  Cumulative  
R2 
Increase in  
R2 
 
β 
Step 1   .35***  .35***   
Condition    -.23 
Explicit S.E. (Phase One)    .57*** 
S.E. Instability        .09 
      
Step 2  .38**  .03   
Condition x Explicit S.E.  
(Phase One) 
        .02 
Condition x S.E. Instability       -.21 
Explicit S.E. (Phase One) x  
S.E. Instability   
   -.17 
       
Step 3  .40**  .02   
Condition x Explicit S.E.  
(Phase One) x S.E. Instability   
     .33 
  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
Summary 
The present study found partial support for the prediction that individuals with 
fragile high self-esteem are engaging in impression management when they report highly 
positive feelings of self-worth. In support of the impression management hypothesis, 
individuals with discrepant high self-esteem (i.e., high explicit self-esteem and low 
implicit self-esteem) reported lower levels of explicit self-esteem under bogus pipeline 
conditions. However, it is important to note that this pattern only emerged when implicit 
self-esteem was measured using the Name-Letter Task. The impression management 
hypothesis was not supported when implicit self-esteem was measured using the Implicit 
Association Test. In addition, the predicted pattern of results was not found for the two 
other markers of self-esteem fragility (i.e., contingent self-esteem and self-esteem 
instability).   
  It was predicted that self-esteem fragility would moderate explicit self-esteem 
level in the laboratory. More specifically, it was predicted that – compared to individuals 
who possessed secure high self-esteem – individuals who possessed fragile high self-
esteem would be more likely to report lower levels of explicit self-esteem in the bogus 
pipeline condition. This prediction was supported by the interaction between 
experimental condition, Phase One explicit self-esteem, and NLT such that individuals 
with discrepant high self-esteem reported significantly lower levels of explicit self-
esteem in the bogus pipeline condition. This finding is interesting in that it suggests that 
individuals with discrepant high self-esteem (i.e., high explicit but low implicit) may be 
engaging in impression management when they claim to possess highly positive feelings 
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of self-worth. In doing so, individuals may stand to gain some of the benefits that are 
associated with the possession of high self-esteem such as being viewed more positively 
by others (Zeigler-Hill & Myers, 2009) and increased social standing (Leary & Downs, 
1995).  
If it is the case that individuals with fragile high self-esteem are intentionally 
reporting higher levels of explicit self-esteem than they may actually possess, then it 
follows that these individuals must have at least some access to their presumed-to-be 
implicit self-esteem. This finding contradicts the commonly held assumption that 
nonreactive measures of self-esteem are capturing attitudes that exist outside of conscious 
awareness (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Jordan et al., 2007; Pelham & Hetts, 1999; 
Zeigler-Hill & Jordan, in press) and is consistent with recent research that has questioned 
this assumption (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Olson et al., 2007; Karpinski & Steinberg, 2006; 
Krizan, 2008). For example, it has been suggested that measures purporting to capture 
implicit self-esteem may instead capture a combination of implicit and explicit self-
esteem (Karpinski & Steinberg, 2006) or wholly explicit self-esteem (Krizan, 2008). For 
instance, Krizan (2008) found many participants to be aware of the self-relevant nature of 
the NLT such that many participants reported recognizing their initials during the NLT. 
Further, Krizan (2008) reported that these individuals were also more likely to report that 
their letter ratings during the NLT were influenced by how much they liked their names. 
Also supporting the contention that individuals have access to their implicit self-esteem, 
Olson and colleagues (2007) reported that the discrepancy between individuals’ explicit 
and implicit self-esteem diminished when individuals were asked to be careful not to 
over-report or under-report their explicit feelings of self-worth. In other words, Olson and 
colleagues contend that individuals have knowledge of their implicit self-esteem but 
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sometimes over- or under-report it as a self-presentational strategy. Taken together, these 
recent findings – along with the results of the present study – support the contention that 
the attitudes captured by some measures of implicit self-esteem may not wholly exist 
outside of conscious awareness. 
In contrast to the results for the NLT, the predicted pattern of results did not 
emerge when implicit self-esteem was measured using the IAT. That is, individuals who 
possessed discrepant high self-esteem were not more likely to report lower levels of 
explicit self-esteem in the bogus pipeline condition. Instead, a significant interaction 
emerged between experimental condition, Phase One explicit self-esteem, and IAT such 
that individuals with secure high self-esteem reported significantly higher levels of 
explicit self-esteem in the control condition. This interaction may simply reflect the 
unchecked and highly positive feelings of self-worth that individuals with secure high 
self-esteem may have experienced in the control condition (Baumeister et al., 1989). In 
other words, individuals who possessed secure high self-esteem in the control condition 
may have reveled in the opportunity to affirm positive views of the self. In contrast, 
individuals with secure high self-esteem in the bogus pipeline condition were reminded to 
think very carefully about accurately reporting their feelings of self-worth. As a result, 
these individuals may have simply adopted a more modest self-presentation by toning 
down their highly positive self-evaluations. 
The divergent outcomes for the NLT and IAT raise the following question: Why 
did self-esteem fragility moderate explicit self-esteem level in the laboratory when 
implicit self-esteem was measured with the NLT but not with the IAT? In order to 
understand why two measures that purport to measure the same underlying construct 
would produce divergent outcomes in the present study, it may be helpful to examine the 
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two measures in terms of their psychometric properties. First, it is worth noting again that 
the measurement of implicit self-esteem has been controversial and plagued with 
inconsistencies since its inception with various measures of implicit self-esteem typically 
having little or no correlation with each other (Bosson et al., 2000; Gebauer, Riketta, 
Broemer, & Maio, 2008; Zeigler-Hill, 2006). This general lack of convergent validity 
between measures of implicit self-esteem has always been problematic, but even more 
troubling for the present study is that – despite sharing similar positive correlations with 
explicit self-esteem – the NLT and the IAT were negatively correlated with each other.  
There are at least two potential reasons for finding an unexpected relationship 
between the NLT and IAT. The first potential explanation concerns the possibility that 
implicit self-esteem may be fluid in nature. This idea is supported by research showing 
IAT scores to be responsive to perceived threats (Rudman, Dohn, & Fairchild, 2007) and 
negative daily events (Dehart & Pelham, 2007) as well as by the low test-retest 
correlations that are typically found for implicit self-esteem measures (e.g., Zeigler-Hill 
& Jordan, in press). If it is the case that implicit self-esteem is fluid in nature – and 
therefore reactive to immediate context – then it may not be surprising to find an 
unexpected relationship between measures that were administered at different times and 
under different conditions. For example, in the present study, the NLT was administered 
online during Phase One of the study whereas the IAT was administered in the laboratory 
during Phase Two of the study. As such, it is possible that the laboratory setting may 
have been disconcerting for some participants compared to the relative comfort of the 
online environment.   
The second potential explanation for the unusual relationship between the NLT 
and IAT is the possibility that the NLT and IAT are capturing either different facets of 
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implicit self-esteem or completely different underlying constructs. This idea has been 
supported by recent research demonstrating the multifaceted nature of implicit self-
esteem (Campbell et al., 2007; Sakellaropoulo & Baldwin, 2007). For example, Campbell 
and colleagues (2007) reported that IAT scores for some individuals vary depending on 
whether the word primes used in the IAT task reflect communal or agentic self-views. 
Similarly, Sakellaropoulo and Baldwin (2007) suggest that implicit self-esteem should be 
examined in terms of the domains of self-liking and self-attractiveness. The idea that 
different measures of implicit self-esteem may capture different facets of implicit self-
esteem is consistent with at least one other previous study where results were reported for 
both the NLT and IAT. In that study, Zeigler-Hill (2006) found that the IAT – but not the 
NLT – predicted self-esteem instability. Due to the lack of additional studies that have 
incorporated multiple measures of implicit self-esteem, it remains unclear whether 
finding different outcomes for the NLT and IAT in the present study is something that 
should be considered unusual or something that is par for the course given the lack of 
convergent validity between measures of implicit self-esteem.  
Another question raised by the present results concerns the lack of convergence 
across markers of fragile self-esteem. In other words, why did self-esteem fragility 
moderate explicit self-esteem level in the laboratory for discrepant high self-esteem but 
not for contingent self-esteem or self-esteem instability? This lack of convergence across 
fragility markers is inconsistent with research that has begun to find relationships 
between and convergence across the markers of self-esteem fragility (Jordan et al., 2003; 
Kernis et al., 2008; Zeigler-Hill, 2006). For example, some research has shown that low 
implicit self-esteem predicts greater self-esteem instability (Zeigler-Hill, 2006). More 
recently, Kernis and colleagues (2008) reported finding significant correlations between 
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measures of contingent self-esteem and self-esteem instability in their laboratory as well 
as a recent study linking all three markers of self-esteem to verbal defensiveness. Given 
these recent findings, it was expected that the present study would result in some manner 
of convergence between the three markers of fragile self-esteem.  
One potential explanation for the different results for the three markers of fragility 
may come from the fact that all of the fragility markers in the present study did not share 
significant correlations. In contrast, when all three markers of fragility recently 
converged to predict verbal defensiveness, it was the case that all three fragility markers 
were also significantly correlated with each other (Kernis et al., 2008). Despite using the 
same measures employed by Kernis and colleagues (2008), the present study did not find 
all three fragility markers to be significantly correlated. Instead, the results for the present 
study only indicated a significant correlation between contingent self-esteem and self-
esteem instability. These results may be due – at least in part – to the relatively small 
sample size and resulting lack of statistical power in the present study. Another potential 
explanation for the lack of convergence between markers of fragile self-esteem may stem 
from the degree of “honesty” required of participants for each marker of fragile self-
esteem. In other words, implicit self-esteem – which is measured indirectly – requires the 
least amount of insight from participants. In contrast, contingent self-esteem and self-
esteem instability require more honest introspection in order for participants to accurately 
report their feelings. This may, perhaps, explain why the predicted effect was found for 
implicit self-esteem but not for contingent self-esteem and self-esteem instability. Again, 
given the lack of studies that have included all three markers of fragility, it is difficult to 
say whether these results should be considered unusual. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
It is important to acknowledge several limitations associated with the present 
study. The first limitation is that the sample was primarily comprised of college students. 
As a result, the results obtained may not generalize to more mature populations. The 
second limitation is that the sample primarily consisted of female participants. This is 
reflective of the low participation rates of men in laboratory-based research studies and is 
consistent with the characteristics of the sample used in recent fragile self-esteem 
research as reported by Kernis and colleagues (2008). The third limitation is the relatively 
small sample size obtained for the present study which may have resulted in a lack of 
statistical power. This limitation is reflective of the difficulty in recruiting participants for 
laboratory-based studies. Although the null results for contingent self-esteem and self-
esteem instability did not remotely approach significance in the present study, increasing 
the sample size in future studies may be helpful in order to rule out the possibility that 
sample size alone was responsible for the lack of significant findings for contingent self-
esteem and self-esteem instability. The fourth limitation is that the present study relied 
solely on self-report measures, leaving open the possibility of positive or negative 
response bias. 
The results of the present study suggest several directions for future research. 
Most importantly, more research is needed to corroborate the present finding that seems 
to suggest that individuals with discrepant high self-esteem are engaging in impression 
management when they claim to possess highly positive feelings of self-worth. If it can 
be established that impression management strategies are being used by individuals with 
fragile high self-esteem, then it would be interesting to investigate the potential real-
world implications of this behavior for these individuals. Second, more studies should 
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include multiple measures of implicit self-esteem in an effort to help elucidate the 
construct of implicit self-esteem. For example, if more studies included multiple 
measures of implicit self-esteem, researchers could compare findings across the different 
measures. This would be helpful in the refinement of the construct of implicit self-esteem 
and could help to clarify some of the confusion surrounding the measurement of implicit 
self-esteem. Finally, it would be helpful if more studies of fragile self-esteem examined 
all three markers of fragility in order to ascertain whether they consistently predict 
similar outcomes. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the present study contributes to our knowledge of self-esteem by 
(a) finding partial support for the prediction that individuals with fragile high self-esteem 
are engaging in impression management when they report highly positive feelings of self-
worth and (b) shedding light on the problem of non-convergence between different 
measures of implicit self-esteem and between the three markers of fragile self-esteem. In 
support of the impression management hypothesis, individuals with discrepant high self-
esteem (i.e., high explicit self-esteem and low implicit self-esteem) reported lower levels 
of explicit self-esteem under bogus pipeline conditions, a pattern which emerged when 
implicit self-esteem was measured using the NLT but not with the IAT. In addition, the 
predicted pattern of results was not found for contingent self-esteem or for self-esteem 
instability.  
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APPENDIX 
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL FORM 
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